Morality in Homosexuality

Note: I posted this electronically for a reason. I'm not sure why anyone would, but don't steal. 

In this essay, I will attempt to evaluate the arguments put forth against homosexuality, both as a movement and as a lifestyle. My claim is that there is nothing inherently immoral about homosexuality, and as such the government does not have any reason to prevent citizens from pursuing fulfilling relationships. I will begin by detailing what I found to be the best-laid argument against homosexuality—the Natural Law theory and modern renditions of it. I will then show counterarguments against anti-homosexual claims, and hopefully show that by restricting marriage to a man and a woman we are senselessly denying a portion of humanity potential happiness and social acceptance in the name of moral welfare.
Let us assume that the state does actually have a right to encroach upon the privacy of its citizens in the name of moral wellbeing. It may prohibit things like abortion, genetic engineering, stem cell research, and gay marriage, citing claims that such things are generally immoral and should therefore be outlawed for the good of the population. However, if such a government existed, it would not be able to universally prohibit homosexuality in particular because not a single adequate argument exists that proves homosexuality is in fact immoral. While the Natural Law theory has proven to be the most formidable argument against homosexuality, it is rife with claims that render it intrinsically inconsistent and fundamentally flawed.
The underlying principle of Natural Law theory is the idea that law was given to us by God, as he, “[chose] to bring into existence beings who can act freely and in accordance with principles of reason” (SEP 3). A Natural Lawyer must therefore, by definition, accept the idea that God exists, has a genuine interest in humanity, and has designed us to act reasonably, i.e. in accordance with his will (4). However, even before the time of Christian theology, this notion of Natural Law was being considered. In the time of classical antiquity, Plato, in Book One of his Laws, condemns homosexuality as “unnatural” (636c), basing his claim that same-sex acts have no higher purpose than pleasure. This is one of the earliest hints that there is a natural function for the human body. Whatever Plato’s belief was concerning the nature of homosexuality does not make him an advocate of Natural Law per se, because the traditional theory of Natural Law is tied to God (although modern proponents of Natural Law theory generally do not rely on theistic beliefs). With that in mind, the philosopher who contributed most to the traditional concept is undoubtedly Thomas Aquinas. His belief concerning Natural Law is that “good is to be done and evil avoided” (4, from his Summa Theologica IaIIae 94, 2). In the question of sexual ethics, his view applies aptly because one of the “goods” he mentions is procreation, and all goods should be pursued (SEP 4).
For Aquinas, marriage and procreation are among the most desirable of human goods because that which results in companionship and offspring while in the realm of marriage is essentially good (4). The potential for offspring is not a necessary factor for Aquinas, so long as the relationship promotes love and wellbeing. However, he restricts his view by stating that the only moral sex acts are those that have the potential to result in procreation if conditions were ideal, i.e. vaginal intercourse. Therefore, any non-vaginal sex is forbidden even for married heterosexuals, and homosexuality is out of the question completely. We are left to infer, then, that the idea of procreation is what makes sex in marriage morally good.
Aquinas also introduces the notion of teleology for the human body; certain parts of the body were designed for a specific function—teeth for chewing, eyes for seeing, and genitals for reproduction. It follows that by using a part of the body for its intended function, a human being is living in accordance with God’s will, since God had created man in his (practical) image. This is the aforementioned traditional view of the Natural Law theory. It is apparent how this belief applies itself to sexuality, in that any act involving the genitals that does not have the intention of reproduction is therefore a misuse of that part of the body. This idea is known as the “perverted faculty argument,” and has since Aquinas’s day seen a decline in its acceptance; New Natural Lawyers concede that body parts can have multiple functions. They also reject the overt reliance theism, as well as the Thomistic belief that human morality is dictated by our natural functions—it is in this way that the New Natural Lawyers deviate from the original concept. However, this deviation is not a complete departure from Aquinas’s view. As Joseph Boyle writes in his essay Natural Law and the Ethics of Traditions, “most Natural Law theorists are self-consciously members of a continuous tradition of moral enquiry which reaches from contemporary neo-scholastic writers back to Aquinas, and which takes Aquinas’ moral writings as a classical source” (Natural Law Theory 4).
This concept of Natural Law pertains to many areas of humanity, but few are more controversial than how it applies to the sexual organs. Following Aquinas’s evaluation of what it means for sex to be moral (i.e. done within the confines of marriage with the intention of procreation), modern proponents of this view use parts Thomistic teleology (as Natural Law theory cannot escape teleology) to justify their opposition of homosexuality, but have made some adaptations in order to respond to the homosexual movement of this past century.
These individuals, dubbed “the New Natural Lawyers” believe homosexuality is morally impermissible and at odds with human nature for reasons such as homosexual relationships negatively influence society by their alarming rates of depression, drug abuse, and disease. They also believe that it destroys the institutions of marriage and family, dehumanizes people, devalues women, is driven by lust, is incapable of supporting the continuation of humanity via procreation, and is in general a misuse of our God-given bodies.

I. The Best Arguments Against Homosexuality—Function, Biology, and Commitment

Both traditional and modern Natural Lawyers (such as David Bradshaw) believe that homosexuality is immoral because it goes against the natural form of the body (Same Sex 17). He is concerned with the notion that homosexuality can influence public policy, making the claim that many would not like homosexuality to be socially accepted. He also suggests that the lifestyle itself is plagued with promiscuity, AIDS, masochism, child molestation, depression, and drug abuse. (18). Unlike the traditional Natural Lawyers, he does not appeal to religion to validate this claim. Instead, he attempts to prove that homosexuality is morally impermissible by showing that the body “carries with it certain moral restrictions” (21).
To elaborate on what a body should and should not do, he groups homosexuality with necrophilia, pederasty, bestiality, and coprophilia. He distinguishes that they are not all “wrong to the same degree (he admits that bestiality is worse than intercourse between two people of the same sex), but it does suggest that they share a certain inner kinship” (25). This “inner kinship” associates homosexuality with things like bestiality in that they are both commonly viewed as perversities. While a gay person would be incensed at the suggestion that their lifestyle is comparable to that of a necrophiliac or pedophile, in Bradshaw’s mind they are similar because all such practices are done outside of marriage, cannot result in reproduction, and are performed by a minority of the population. This last distinction may be the most important, as it is what differentiates homosexuality, bestiality, and pederasty from normative heterosexual relationships. In other words, Sex between a man and a woman is generally unproblematic in almost all societies, and the reason is that male/female intercourse “fits the body’s moral space uniquely well” (26).
Aside from his insistence upon moral space, the other key feature to Bradshaw’s anti-
homosexuality argument is that procreation supposes a joint commitment between a man and a woman (26). This idea of procreation, he says, is one of the “deepest roots of human society” (27), because a woman needs a man and to procreate (and vice versa). Ideally, once a couple consummates their marriage the resulting child unites them more than sex alone would. Not only that, but a child adds to the continuation of the species, which is a good that Natural Law theorists (both old and new) agree upon. Even if the sex between a heterosexual couple may not result in a child, Bradshaw says it is still the ideal relationship because heterosexual intercourse:
“[U]nites body and spirit in a single harmonious endeavor; it raises the body to the level of the spirit and focuses the spirit within the body. Second, the act engages the body in a profoundly human way. It integrates the body within a drama that is and always has been the primary means by which the two halves of the human race come to value one another.” (27)
In other words, a sterile heterosexual marriage still allows for sex because it enables them to participate in the “larger human drama” (29). Such a couple cannot procreate due to sterility, but two men cannot reproduce because of a specific biological condition.
His argument does not escape from a religious connotation completely, however, as he concludes his essay with the following statement: “One must hate the sin and love the sinner. I would add that part of loving the sinner is to hate the sin. Only when the sin is seen as what it is, as wrong and destructive, can the truly important work of repentance and healing begin” (30). These final sentences imply that homosexuality is a choice, and that two gay men can never truly be happy.
Like Bradshaw, Michael Levin agrees that “the penis is for vaginal intercourse, not anal intercourse with men” (Levin 31). He also considers the anathema of disease, depression, and promiscuity allegedly found in the homosexual community. However, unlike Bradshaw he accepts the evidence that homosexuality is not a choice, citing scientific studies that focus on genetic influence and the small hypothalamus of homosexuals (36). There is a strong reliance on biology and an eschewal of traditional religious dependence in his essay, which is a more modern and scientific contribution to the Natural Law theory.
Levin appears to be going against one of the most basic tenets of Natural Law theory—that God had created human beings—by saying that “organisms evolved without a plan, by natural selection” (32). He goes on to say that homosexuality has a genetic influence, and also proclaims the relatively simple but important idea that “a thing may have many functions” (32). These are three ideas that definitely put Levin outside of traditional Natural Law theory, and thus make him appear as an advocate of a modern Natural Law. Like his fellow New Natural Lawyers, he concerns himself with the question of function and abnormality: specifically, why is it that homosexuality is considered abnormal? To answer this question, he uses the idea of function and essentially states that since our sex drive was a result of reproduction, homosexuality is by definition abnormal despite the idea that homosexuality is genetic (33-36).
With that in mind, “homosexuality is a malfunction of the sex drive, aversion to it may have been selected for by threats to fitness it presents, such as the spread of disease via homosexual practices” (44). Therefore, the main argument against homosexuality is that it is abnormal, whereas heterosexuality is normative for a reason (in this case, a scientific reason, one that does not invoke the question of morality). For Levin, the problem with homosexuality is that it is, he claims, an undesirable genetic flaw because it goes against the function of our libido (to reproduce). With this emphasis on function, Levin is considered a New Natural Lawyer, despite the fact that he does not concern himself with the morality of homosexuality (as do his contemporaries). This is seen toward the end of his essay, when he says, “One must also concede that there is nothing ‘wrong’ with homosexuality in the cosmic scheme of things, and that homosexuals do not chose [sic] their desires” (46).
His emphasis on genetics makes up the bulk of the latter half of his essay, the portion concerned with homosexuality and public policy via the idea of civil rights for homosexuals. On the question of civil rights, he believes that just because a homosexual is born that way does not qualify him or her as part of a group that requires social acceptance and equal rights (such as African Americans, women, etc.). Levin believes that something like homosexuality, though genetic, does not automatically qualify a person for certain rights. The nearest example, I can imagine, would be colorblind or redheaded people, a genetic minority in America, but not eligible for civil rights. He says that to restrict from discrimination based on inherited traits goes against common sense, as “people pick friends and mates because of looks, intelligence, and personality, traits which are significantly heritable and certainly unchosen” (38). Whether the federal government should act the same way is a different story.
On the topic of public policy, the state, as described by John Finnis in his essay Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation,” “[has] the authority to discourage […] homosexual conduct and ‘orientation’” (1). The state would do so, according to Finnis, because support of gay rights consequently promotes: “(I) a psychological or psychosomatic disposition inwardly orienting one towards homosexual activity; (II) the deliberate decision so to orient one’s public behavior as to express or manifest one’s active interest in and endorsement of homosexual conduct and/or forms of life which presumptively involve such conduct” (3). We have left Levin’s scientific approach to the anti-gay argument, and have come back to the side of the issue more concerned with morality. Following the logic of premises I and II of Finnis’s statement, merely speaking of homosexuality in a positive light is enough to turn one gay.
In another essay entitled Natural Law Theory and Limited Government, Finnis reiterates this idea that even talking about homosexuals can cause a person to become one (Natural Law 12). Finnis begins this section of his essay (section V) by quoting Musonius Rufus: “One begins to lose one’s hesitation to do disgraceful things when one loses one’s hesitation to speak of them” (12). He points out that the great thinkers of classical antiquity, despite being immersed in a homoerotic culture, determined that homosexuality was a disgrace to humanity and that such a relationship cannot realize the good of friendship (12-13). This idea of friendship seems vague, as it is used in this sense to refer to platonic relationships, but also used to describe the relationship between sexually intimate couples. We are left to infer, then, that homosexuality corrupts both platonic and sexual friendships.
The homosexuality subculture, Finnis contends, is damaging to families and all institutions that promote the idea of family. As children are being brought up in public, homosexuality should be discouraged so they are not “lured by temptation into falling away from their own aspirations to be people of integrated good character, and to be autonomous, self-controlled rather than slaves to impulse and sensual gratification” (2).
Along with his idea that homosexuality is persuasively overpowering, Finnis claims that homosexuality by its nature devalues women (as already seen with the Bradshaw reading), as it is “inconsistent with a proper recognition of the equality of women with men in intrinsic worth” (5). Once again, this “intrinsic worth” refers to the idea of a body-spirit transcendence, a relationship that can fulfill both man and woman in its practice. Of a married heterosexual couple, Finnis says, “[T]heir union in a sexual act of the reproductive kind (whether or not actually reproductive or even capable of resulting in generation in this instance) can actualize and allow them to experience their real common good” (8). This assumes that the union between two people only works if there is a biological possibility for reproduction (whether that that possibility is present at the time makes no difference, so long as it is fundamentally there). He believes that the “common good of marriage has two aspects”—an act of friendship and procreation (10). It seems that the friendship aspect would be impossible without the procreation aspect, as his definition of friendship in this sense seems to be the willingness for two people to consummate their relationship. As already mentioned, however, whether procreation is actually possible is irrelevant so long as the fundamental possibility exists (i.e. under different circumstances, the couple would procreate).
As for those who are not heterosexual, married couples, their sexual relationship falls outside the realm of acceptable sexuality, and homosexuals are consequently the worst offenders. Homosexuality, according to Finnis, is:
Deeply hostile to the self-understanding of those members of the community who are willing to commit themselves to real marriage in the understanding that its sexual joys are not mere instruments or accompaniments to, or mere compensations for, the accomplishment of marriage’s responsibilities, but rather enable the spouses to actualize and experience their intelligent commitment to share in those responsibilities, in that genuine self-giving. (12)
He believes that simply the presence of homosexuality is an affront against non-homosexuals and threatens our society by its very existence. This willingness for people to abstain from being gay and instead pursue heterosexual marriage implies that everyone wants to be gay, but is showing a high level of independence and restraint by choosing to be with a partner of the opposite sex in a “self-giving” relationship.
This idea of responsibility and commitment suggests that Finnis is talking about a couple’s ability to bear children, but not necessarily. In response to the idea of sterile couples actualizing themselves in a sexual relationship, he suggests that it is acceptable. He says that in these days of Natural Law theory, “procreation and children are neither the end (whether primary or secondary) to which marriage is instrumental” (13). This focus on the pragmatism of heterosexual marriage, that it has a positive effect on humanity regardless if it results in offspring, is what makes him a New Natural Lawyer. On the question of sterility in marriage, Finnis says, “[P]arenthood and children and family are the intrinsic fulfillment of a communion which, because it is not merely instrumental, can exist and fulfill the spouses even if procreation happens to be impossible for them” (14).
In his essay Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation,” Finnis discusses the idea of monogamy and rationalizes that it is so difficult in the gay community because many relationships are purely sexual. He claims that “only a tiny proportion [of gay men] seriously attempt marital fidelity, the commitment to exclusiveness” (19). Here lies an important part in the homosexuality argument—promiscuity. It may be that the real reason people view homosexuality as immoral and homosexuals as lecherous is not that it seems to be a misuse of the body, but it fails to encourage long-lasting relationships by its alleged focus on pleasure and pleasure alone.

II. Counterarguments to Anti-Homosexual Views

Recognizing the Good in Homosexual Unions

Naturally, there is notable opposition to supporters of Natural Law theory and its modern advocates. They contend that the traditional Natural Law theory fails on numerous counts (for example, its emphasis on teleology and the body as a dictator of morality), and even new adaptations of Natural Law fail on similar premises. To begin, there is an emphasis on the idea of “goods” in Natural Law theory, and this dates back to the Thomistic idea that some things are worth pursuing. In more recent times, the New Natural Lawyers such as Robert George endorse this traditional idea. He says, “Only intrinsic goods, i.e. things that are intelligibly desirable for their own sakes, can be basic reasons for action.” (George 34). And later, only a paragraph below: “only that which is understood to be worthwhile can provide a reason for action. Only that which is humanly fulfilling can be understood to be worthwhile” (34). Traditionally, this good is viewed as applicable to marriage (the good of fulfillment and procreation), but there does not seem to be any reason why a fulfilling homosexual relationship cannot be viewed as good based on the definition; it is desirable for its own sake, and is therefore a reason for action. Aquinas himself, as previously mentioned, says that good ought to be done and evil should be avoided.
The first problem with this idea is that Natural Law obviously implies that a homosexual relationship is not a “good,” and is therefore not worthy of pursuit. This can be easily countered by the fact that men and women who are attracted to members of the same sex feel a level of fulfillment just as any heterosexual would in a relationship—married or not. Despite what Finnis thinks about homosexuality as a lecherous plague on society, the gay lifestyle is not some pleasure-worshipping cult; its members simply seek fulfilling, life-enhancing relationships with people they are attracted to physically, mentally, and biologically. The goods that come out of such a happy union far outweigh any supposed evils. Happy people, gay or straight, contribute to society in numerous ways and enhance the lives of others. Therefore, they directly participate within this “larger human drama,” as Bradshaw calls it, because they are positive members of humanity. In his defense of homosexuality, John Corvino states that the anti-gay opposition fails to realize the fact that homosexual relationships promote happiness, a basic human good that, according to Natural Law theory, should be pursued. A sexual relationship, whether it is hetero- or homosexual, can encourage growth, communication, and fulfillment (Corvino 4). Even if homosexuality was a choice and not a genetic disposition, the fact that it is an alternative lifestyle does not make it any more wrong than a right-handed writer suddenly deciding to write with his left hand (5).
The idea of homosexuality as a destructive force is mainly exemplified in both David Bradshaw’s and John Finnis’s previously discussed essays, in which they declare it a corruptive presence/distraction in society. They cite the unusually high occurrence of AIDS, depression, and drug abuse in the gay community, suggesting that the lifestyle itself is the reason for such problems. They fail to take into account, however, external forces that create such problems. In response to the alleged high rates of AIDS, drug use, and depression among the homosexuality community, Corvino refers to the idea that correlation does not imply causation; society’s treatment of homosexuals can very well be a source for many of the problems that plague the gay community. It is also ridiculous to assume that AIDS discriminates between homosexuals and heterosexuals, as the conditions that lead to it apply just as easily to one gender as they do another (9). In response to the anti-gay claim that AIDS is mainly prevalent in homosexual relationships, Corvino cites the study that penile-vaginal intercourse is linked to cervical cancer (10). There are also many people who are depressed, and many who struggle with drugs. If a majority of people is going to discourage a group of people because who they are, then surely many members of that minority are going to feel miserable, and some may turn to drugs as a way of coping. Bradshaw also made the claim that the homosexual lifestyle is plagued with child molestation among other things, and Corvino repudiates this by citing the fact that most child molesters are heterosexual, and those that have, “molested boys were attracted to adult women and not men at all” (11).
The second reason why Natural Lawyers do not believe a homosexual union is a fundamental good has already been explicated—homosexual intercourse cannot result in the actualization of its participants, nor result in any sense of commitment because of its fundamental procreative inability. However, such reasons also apply to non-marital unions of every sort; the result is a level of sexual morality that is highly limiting, and fundamentally does not even apply to many married heterosexual couples (thanks to woefully high divorce rates). The good of marriage, it seems, can only be realized when two heterosexual people spend their entire lives faithfully together, and never experiment with any type of intercourse other than vaginal.
Finnis seems compelled to argue about the seemingly irresistible nature of homosexuality and its supposed focus on hedonism. He contends, almost in an appeal to emotion, that our children have the right to grow up without having an ever-present temptation of homosexuality in the public arena. Though he made this argument in reference to public policy and about why homosexuality should not be a public issue, it is easy to see how some proponents of the anti-gay argument apply this idea to gay adoption. The screening process a couple is forced to undergo is arguably lax, as there are many cases of children ending up in bad homes with bad people. Restricting adoption to heterosexual couples only is ludicrous when there is a committed homosexual couple that simply want to nurture a child in a loving home, consequently gaining the responsibility and feeling of unity that a child, according to Germain Grisez, brings forth. Denying enriching childhoods and the guidance of two responsible adults (who happen to be gay) is itself an irresponsible and irrational move on the part of the adoption agencies and the state policies that guide them. The reasoning behind this, one can only assume, is that allowing a child to be adopted by a gay couple endangers them in ways that are never truly specified, but we are left to infer that it may encourage them to partake in the alternative lifestyle. This is patently absurd and by all rights incorrect, especially when New Natural Lawyers like Michael Levin have admitted that homosexuality is indeed a genetic predisposition. Similarly, there is “no evidence [that] suggests that exposing kids to homosexuality turns them gay” (Corvino 11).


“Moral Space” and Physicality

The Natural Law theorist’s belief that the body by its very form incorporates moral restrictions is an ill-conceived idea. Earlier, Bradshaw mentioned what he referred to as a body’s “moral space,” and that heterosexual intercourse fits this moral space uniquely well. His idea of this moral space seems to be more physical, due to the fact that he believes the biological parts to match up, or fit “uniquely well,” when he could have said something ethereal, something more appropriate to the subject of morality. Why suggest that heterosexual intercourse fits some sort of space if there is not at least a little bit of physicality being considered? It is here that he begins to sound like a traditional Natural Law theorist; the physical body implies moral restrictions simply because of its form. Bradshaw does not go on to say what else falls outside of our body’s “moral” space, but by following his definition, things like skydiving would be immoral as they fall outside our moral space (we do not have wings, therefore we are not equipped to freefall).
Another enigmatic term mentioned by Bradshaw is the phrase “larger human drama.” How is it that heterosexual intercourse (and only heterosexual intercourse) within marriage allows the man and woman to partake in this human drama, while all others (homosexuals, celibates, children) are excluded? His idea seems to imply that only through the physical act of heterosexual sex can a person hope to become fully actualized as a human being. Once again, there is an over-reliance on physicality at play. Following this logic, a person like Mother Teresa (who was obviously involved in humanity) is outside the “larger human drama” because of her virginity.
But let us assume that their emphasis on physicality and anatomy is a legitimate way to determine morality. Their argument does not truly account for the idea that sterile heterosexual couples are no different than homosexual couples. “All of the goods that can be shared by sterile heterosexuals can also be shared by committed homosexual couples” (Macedo 39). Sure there is a fundamental difference; if circumstances were different, the heterosexual couple could procreate. However, playing with “ifs” is not a good way to justify a belief that results in deciding that a significant portion of humanity is immoral. Sexual organs deprived of their fertility become simply orifices and not “reproductive organs.” Stephen Macedo counters this argument best by saying:
“The new Natural Law’s position on sexual morality falls on two counts. It falls first because of its extremely narrow account of valuable sexuality[…]an account that is unreasonably reductionist and puritanical. Secondly, the new Natural Law fails to offer any rational ground for treating sex within sterile heterosexual marriages differently from sex within committed homosexual relationships.” (42-43)
There are certain parts of the body that do not lead to reproduction, and sterile sexual organs are no different. Even if, for some coincidental reason, intercourse fails to result in children, it is still acceptable to remain married to that sterile partner. This is yet another way in which the Natural Law argument fails in that it seems to dismiss sterility all too conveniently. Natural Lawyers make allowances for sterile conditions in marriage by arguing that it does not matter because the couple, under different biological circumstances, is fundamentally equipped to procreate. Furthermore, while the idea of procreation is out of the question, they can still participate in an actualizing and committed relationship. There is no argument about the latter half of that line of reasoning; homosexual intercourse can be equally fulfilling and its participants can be just as committed (if not more so) to each other. The major discrepancy is of course this idea that a married sterile heterosexual couple is somehow more moral than a gay or lesbian couple. Reproduction is absent from all cases, and it is absurd to argue that the heterosexual couple feels more committed to each other because of their anatomical differences. Andrew Koppelman sums up the result of this Natural Law logic with this belief that “if sterile heterosexual relationships can be marital, then so too can homosexual relationships” (44).
If the New Natural Lawyers truly want to rely on physical function in order to define morality, then they need to somehow reconcile the fact that there is a sexual organ that serves no purpose for reproduction. It has been found that the clitoris is the only part of the human body that does not serve multiple functions; it exists solely for stimulation. To be consistent with Natural Law, sex between two females could fulfill a part of the female body’s purpose in the sense that it makes use of the clitoris, even if the chance for reproduction is missing. In short, those who oppose gay marriage need to show how a meaningful bond with another can be forged in the absence of sex (Corvino 10). If this can be done, then there is consequently no reason for heterosexuals to have sex either. But other aspects of intercourse make it more than an act done to unite and actualize two people.
Heterosexual intercourse is described as an act in which the body and spirit “unit[e] in a single harmonious endeavor.” Aside from an appeal to emotion, this argument is a very maudlin way of looking at something that is also referred to as a continuation of the species. He infers that heterosexual sex is not only fulfilling, but transcendental as it seems to cross the physical world, but perhaps equally strange is his claim that the act itself is the primary way in which men and women value each other. Again, this seems to rely heavily on the physical body and says nothing about other forms of appreciation.
One half of humanity automatically values the other half simply because of a physical, biological difference. I cannot argue that sex may be the main way men value women, but this seems to run into a problem when things like platonic relationships are considered. Does a non-sexual friend value a woman less than her husband (who may treat her terribly) simply because he has never slept with her? Does this also mean that all gay men do not and cannot ever appreciate or value women? Can lesbians ever appreciate or value men? A gay man with female friends (gay or straight females) and a lesbian with male friends (gay or straight males) refute this claim. As such, one may see that there are problems with Bradshaw’s over-reliance on physicality.
The Natural Law theorists are not only dualistic in the human and natural teleological sense, but also in their curious emphasis on biological unity and ethereal unity. They attempt to de-sexualize sex by pinning a focus on a deep, spiritual bond, but they also press the importance of a biological (physical) bond. So which is it? Sex is physical—why do the Natural Lawyers consider it more than a physical act while at the same time relying on its physicality?

Homosexuality as False Anathema

A favorite claim of anti-gay advocates is that homosexuality promotes a host of injuries against humanity, not the least of which includes diseases, depression, and hedonism. This has, unfortunately, been a long-standing and even institutionalized view of homosexuals; up until 1973, homosexuality was considered a psychiatric disorder and was listed as a mental disorder in the American Psychiatric Association’s DSM-2 (Margolis 288). As we have seen, Finnis made the claim that homosexuality is a great universal temptation, and weak-minded children will not be able to resist its influence. He also infers that the average gay man is hedonistic and has no sense of restraint, while the normative heterosexual shows great fortitude and independence by resisting the pull of homosexuality. Obviously, there is a problem with this idea, as counter-examples can be easily cited. There are plenty of heterosexuals (children and adults) who show no sense of restraint over a variety of things, and never mind the fact that Lesbians have a lower rate of promiscuity than men (Macedo 41).
Those who believe that homosexuality is a plague insist that by its very nature, it devastates society generally in that it injures the family directly. However, such people are curiously ignorant of the damage that heterosexuals do to the institution of family themselves. “There is a crisis of the family in America, but what could be easier in the face of rampant heterosexual promiscuity, premarital sex, teenage pregnancy, and sky-rocketing divorce rates than to fasten our attention on a long despised class of people who bear no children?” (33). Those who believe homosexuality to be immoral and an affront against family might make more sense if they rephrase their argument as, “the American family is threatened enough, we do not need more people destroying its tradition.” Though it is still wrong, at least in that way it acknowledges that married, heterosexual couples are fallible.
Let us not forget the fact that “uncontracepted heterosexual sex risks the great evil of bringing unwanted children into the world” (Macedo 32). Naturally there is no such threat in homosexuality; on the contrary, some gay and lesbian couples actually want children, but when they attempt to give a loving home to a cast-off child, they are denied the right to do so.
However, Finnis contends that our children have the right to grow up without having an ever-present temptation of homosexuality in the public arena. Though he made this argument in reference to public policy and about why homosexuality should not be a public issue, it is easy to see how some proponents of the anti-gay argument apply this idea to gay adoption. The screening process a couple is forced to undergo is arguably lax, as there are many cases of children ending up in bad homes with bad people. Restricting adoption to heterosexual couples only is ludicrous when there is a committed homosexual couple that simply want to nurture a child in a loving home, consequently gaining the responsibility and feeling of unity that a child, according to Germain Grisez, brings forth. Denying enriching childhoods and the guidance of two responsible adults (who happen to be gay) is itself an irresponsible and irrational move on the part of the adoption agencies and the state policies that guide them. The reasoning behind this, one can only assume, is that allowing a child to be adopted by a gay couple endangers them in ways that are never truly specified, but we are left to infer that it may encourage them to partake in the alternative lifestyle. This is patently absurd and by all rights incorrect, especially when New Natural Lawyers like Michael Levin have admitted that homosexuality is indeed a genetic predisposition. Similarly, there is “no evidence [that] suggests that exposing kids to homosexuality turns them gay” (Corvino 11).


Commitment—Marriage and Children

The final counterargument to anti-homosexuality is concerned with the idea of commitment. Specifically, why do the New Natural Lawyers insist that commitment in a homosexual relationship is impossible? As we have seen, a strong emphasis on biological union and reproduction is incorporated into the arguments of Natural Lawyers, insinuating that the only thing that really matters in human relationships is a rudimentary biological difference. There is a strange focus on the functions of parts of the human body, but as with other things in nature, certain things seem to have multiple purposes. Trees give off oxygen in the day, but they also serve to hold soil in place, as well as provide shelter and sustenance for numerous animals. For Natural Lawyers this is acceptable, but when it comes to the human body, a penis is meant only for reproduction (even though it has another function—releasing waste). This discrepancy of the Natural Lawyers is described as: “a fundamental, typically modern, dualism of a non-teleological natural science and a teleological science of man.” (Koppelman 50).
It seems to be that the good associated with heterosexual marriage, in the Thomistic view and even in the modern view, is that intercourse (vaginal intercourse only, as it is the only acceptable form of sex) has the potential to result in offspring. Despite the fact that certain periods of time exist when it is biologically impossible for a fertile couple to conceive, it is enough that at least during some moments, children may result. This goes back to the purpose and function of the sexual organs: to procreate. Though the New Natural Law theorists have already admitted that a body part can have multiple functions, their insistence upon procreation suggests otherwise about what they believe a penis should be used for.
Having children is thought of a uniting endeavor, and thus helps to bring the man and woman closer together. However, it seems that a truly committed couple does not need anything else to enhance their relationship—there are instances in which women intentionally skip their birth control pill just because they do not want the man to leave them. This is a risky choice on their part, but serves to exemplify the idea that some people do not have children in order to become closer, but so that they can be close in the first place. It follows that a truly committed, perfectly fulfilling relationship is one in which its participants do not need to rely on anything other than each other for commitment.
Regardless, on the subject of rearing children, Koppelman cites Germain Grisez, a man noted for his opposition to homosexuality, by quoting: “For parenthood is far more a moral than a biological relationship: its essence is not so much in begetting and giving birth as in readiness to accept the gift of life, commitment to nurture it, and faithful fulfillment of that commitment through many years” (47, from Grisez, The Way, 689). Grisez actually downplays the “giving birth” part of having children (some people refer to it as a miracle), in exchange for a willingness to accept it and a commitment to nurture and maintain that fulfilling relationship over time. By this logic, then, a sterile couple should by all rights seek to adopt a child or consider a surrogate mother/father to bear biological children. It also follows that there is no reason that a homosexual couple cannot achieve this level of commitment that children apparently encourage through practices like adoption or in-vitro fertilization.
The argument of having and rearing children appears to be a focus for the New Natural Lawyers, but they fail to take into account the fact that not every heterosexual couple makes good parents. There are, of course, cases in which children conceived in marriage are given up for adoption, are aborted, are regarded as “accidents,” and are born to a couple who eventually divorce. The also fail to consider women who get pregnant (or men who impregnate women) solely for the purpose of preventing their partner from leaving them. This idea of commitment, as we see all too often, is not as prominent as people like Koppelman, Grisez, Bradshaw, and Finnis would like to believe.
If the biological possibility for reproduction was present in homosexual relationships, evidence refutes the idea that gays and lesbians are gay solely because there is no chance of reproduction. They do not engage in homosexual intercourse just because there is no chance for procreation, but because they are biologically attracted to one another. According to a report in the United Kingdom by Out Now Consulting, three percent of gay men and three percent of lesbians “intend to seek adoption during the next 5 years” (Johnson). Other statistics indicate: “A further 5 percent of gay men intend to father a child themselves, and 18 percent of lesbians by giving birth. One in five lesbians (20 percent) are already mothers and 11 percent of gay male respondents indicated that they are already fathers” (Johnson). If reproduction were biologically possible, there would be homosexual couples that would take steps to ensure that their intercourse results in children.

Clearly it is irrational for the state to intrude on the privacy of its citizens by restricting marriage to a man and a woman in the name of morality. There is nothing fundamentally immoral about homosexuality, and as we have seen, any attempt at creating a link between the physical body and morality is erroneous. The New Natural Law theorists attempt to establish such a connection is faulty, as it carries with it at least a partial reliance on natural teleology. Though they differ from the tradition of Natural Law in its Thomistic conception by focusing less on teleology and theism and more on social and biological science, they cannot escape the fact that their modern renditions of Natural Law fail to account for things like sterile heterosexual couples and commitment between gay and lesbian partners. If the state truly wants to support the wellbeing of its citizens, it would realize that the benefits of legitimatizing homosexual marriage far outweigh any conceivable negative effects, and even if it were concerned with protecting the population’s morality by restricting immoral activities, immorality is a word that, as we have seen, cannot be adequately applied to the issue of homosexuality.
































Works Cited

Bradshaw, David. A Reply to Corvino. Prtd. in John Corvino, ed., Same Sex: Debating the Ethics, Science, and Culture of Homosexuality. Lanham, MD. Rowman, 1997.

Corvino, John. Why Shouldn’t Tommy and Jim Have Sex? A Defense of Homosexuality. Same Sex: Debating the Ethics, Science, and Culture of Homosexuality. Ed. John Corvino. Lanham, MD. Rowman, 1997.

Finnis, John. Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation. Prtd. in John Corvino, ed., Same Sex: Debating the Ethics, Science, and Culture of Homosexuality.
Lanham, MD. Rowman, 1997; 31-43.

----------Natural Law Theory and Limited Government. Prtd. in Robert P. George, ed., Natural Law, Liberalism, and Morality. Oxford UP, New York. 2001; 12-17.

Johnson, Ian. Gay Adoption in UK – 3% of Gays and Lesbians Want to Adopt Child. Out Now Diva and Times Gay Readers Surveys. Webwire.com. 22 January 2007. 16 April 2008. http://www.webwire.com/ViewPressRel.asp?aId=26534.

Koppelman, Andrew. Homosexual Conduct: A Reply to the New Natural Lawyers. Prtd. in John Corvino, ed., Same Sex: Debating the Ethics, Science, and Culture of Homosexuality. Lanham, MD. Rowman, 1997.

Levin, Michael. Homosexuality, Abnormality, and Civil Rights. “Public Affairs Quarterly.” 96; 10 (1): 31-48.

Macedo, Stephen. Against the Old Sexual Morality of the New Natural Law. Prtd. in Robert P. George, ed., Natural Law, Liberalism, and Morality. Oxford UP, New York. 2001; 27-48.

Margolis, Joseph. The Question of Homosexuality. Prtd. In Robert Baker and Frederick Elliston, eds., Philosophy and Sex. Buffalo, New York. 1975; 288-302.

The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. The Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford U. Stanford, CA. 23 Sept. 2002. 21 January 2008. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-ethics/.





Works Referenced

S. R. Johnson, E. M. Smith, and S. M. Guenther, "Comparison of Gynecological Health Care Problems between Lesbian and Bisexual Women," Journal of Reproductive Medicine, 32 (1987), 805–811.

Pictures from an ice storm

Ice thorns.

Some rubble

Grass and barbs.